5.3.1 Constraints
Constraints due to the process
Some of the criticisms of the PRS concern the design of the process. First there are some internal constraints that are implicit in all large organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF. It takes time before all actors have internalised and understood a new concept.
The instruments of the Bank and the Fund (e.g. the CAS, PRGF) are supposed to be fully aligned with the PRSP. However, in reality the own guidelines and rules of these institutions constrain them considerably. For example, the CAS does not seem to be fully aligned to the PRS concept. Drafts are often not published or discussed with the civil society, which makes it impossible for the latter to influence the CAS.
Theoretically, the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) aims at facilitating the implementation of the national development goals of the PRS, seeking to ensure that the poverty reduction objectives of the country are taken into account. In reality, however, the PRSCs are not very well-aligned. Some critics furthermore argue that the process is strongly donor-driven; indeed, it is quite likely that the macroeconomic programmes of the IMF shape the macroeconomic programmes of the PRS, rather than vice versa. Countries writing a PRSP are among the poorest in the world and are unable either to have a major influence on world politics or on the decisions of the World Bank and the IMF. In fact, the international finance institutions still have the final decision on whether a PRSP is approved or not. In many countries, the key motivation for starting a PRS process is not poverty reduction but instead obtaining access to debt relief and credits. Additionally, there is the problem of funding the planned projects. In general, funds and credits from both the World Bank and the IMF are usually not enough to finance the whole budget needed to implement the PRSP. Nevertheless, the link between PRS and debt relief strengthens the power of World Bank and IMF, which does not allow developing countries much flexibility to implement their own programmes.
Content
Many authors state that, thematically, PRSCs (and indirectly, the PRSP) do not represent a real change from the previous structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). A given country and the international finance institutions may agree to continue to focus adjustment programmes on macroeconomic issues, e.g. inflation, growth, privatisation, market efficiency and investment in human resources. In this case, self-censorship may take place, leading the country to fulfil the expectations of the World Bank and the IMF instead of insisting on its own specific programmes. Another problem is that the international finance institutions and the countries insist that the objective of the PRSCs is to support “pro-poor growth”, even though there is no satisfactory definition of this key term.
It is therefore not surprising that the “new” adjustment programmes do not meet the needs of the extremely poor. Quite often poverty is defined in terms of income, thereby excluding other factors such as powerlessness. The World Bank has developed a technique for Poverty Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) which analyses the impact of macroeconomic reforms on the poor, but it has only rarely applied this method to date.
In fact, the PRSPs of very different countries tend to be quite similar, and this hardly indicates genuine ownership and participation. The civil society rarely participates in the discussion of macroeconomic issues. As a result, “active participation” generally only concerns classic “soft issues” such as health, social protection and education. One solution is to establish links with local universities and to hire a professional to deal with specialist economic topics (see Chapter 4: Bangladesh).
Inadequate participation
The quality of participation is a serious cause for concern, because the participatory process itself and the participants may significantly influence the successful implementation of the PRS.
The idea of civil society participation in the PRS concept is based on a western understanding of nation states and democracy, and may be difficult to adapt to countries with a completely different political history and social structure.
Another problem within the PRS process is the lack of access to information: often the process is not transparent and is difficult to understand. For example, the PRSP and relevant documents may be available only in English and not in the national/local language(s).
Normally the government or the department in charge decides who participates in the PRS process. This can lead to the exclusion of relevant stakeholders, even if they are already politically organised, such as parliaments and trade unions. The selection of participants is not necessarily made according to their legitimacy and representation. Another challenge concerns the structure and organisation of participatory events: too often preparation and execution are insufficient, e.g. invitations are only received at extremely short notice, while papers for preparation are either sent shortly before the workshop or not at all. It is a structural dilemma that there is always too little time allocated for preparing the PRSP, despite the fact that adequate participation needs ample preparation time. All of these factors contribute to low quality. However, even if the participation is adequate and adapted, it does not necessarily mean that the final paper includes the inputs of the civil society. Spranger and Wolf summarise this experience as follows: “I participate, you participate, he/she participates, we participate, you participate and THEY decide” (Spranger and Wolf, 2003, p. 56).
As explained above, the World Bank and the IMF did not define or set standards for participation; this omission is certainly also a contributing factor to the overall lack of quality. In fact, until now participation has mostly taken the form of consultations. The international finance institutions and the civil society (via NGOs) , however, assess this completely differently, with the World Bank and the IMF stating that the influence of the civil society is high, even though NGOs feel that the opposite is the case.
The low quality of participation is not only due to the donors and the governments, but also to the civil society itself. Often financial means, knowledge about international cooperation and/or insufficient numbers of skilled staff limit capacity and therefore active participation.
